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PROCEDURALISATION'S TRIUMPH
AND ENGAGEMENT'S PROMISE
IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
LITIGATION
BRIAN RAY.
ABSTRACT
Three of the Constitutional Court's socio-economic rights decisions of the 2009 term are
the culmination of a strong trend towards the proceduralisation of socio-economic rights
that many commentators have argued fails to fulfil their original promise. This triumph of
proceduralisation undeniably restricts the direct trans formative potential of these rights.
But there is another aspect to this trend - an aspect reflected in the Court's emphasis
on participatory democracy and the ability of procedural remedies to democratise the
rights-enforcement process. This article considers what the triumph of proceduralisation
means for future social and economic rights litigation and argues that properly developed
the engagement remedy can give poor people and their advocates an important and power
ful enforcement tool. At the same time, engagement can help strengthen and promote
consistent attention to the constitutional values these rights protect. Tapping this potential
requires the Constitutional Court and lower courts to apply the remedy more consistently,
to develop its requirements more fully and to apply those requirements robustly where
government fails to engage meaningfully on social welfare policy. The courts are only the
starting point, however. For engagement to truly succeed, government must develop com
prehensive engagement policies and institutionalise those policies at all levels. Finally,
civil society must expand its role beyond pressing for engagement in individual cases into
advocating for such institutionalisation.

Writing for a unanimous Court in the water-rights case Mazibuko v City of
Johannesburg, Justice Kate O'Regan summarised the reasonableness review
the Court has applied in each of its socio-economic rights cases:
A reasonableness challenge requires government to explain the choices it has made. To do so,
it must provide the information it has considered and the process it has followed to determine
its policy ... If the process followed by government is flawed or the information gathered is
obviously inadequate or incomplete, appropriate relief may be sought.'

She then explained, '[i]n this way, the social and economic rights entrenched
in our Constitution may contribute to the deepening of democracy. They
enable citizens to hold government accountable not only through the ballot
box but also, in a different way, through litigation'. 2

2

Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I would like to acknowledge the
excellent research and editing assistance of Amy Burchfield, and the helpful comments and sugges
tions from Jonathan Klaaren and the SAJHR's anonymous reviewers.
2010 (4) (CC) para 71. In this case the Court rejected claims by residents of Soweto that the instal
lation of prepaid water meters and the City of Johannesburg's broader water policy violated their
right to access to water in s 27 of the Constitution ofthe Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996.
Ibid para 169.
Ibid.
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This is the strongest statement yet of the Court's preference for procedural
remedies that promote political solutions when addressing social and economic
rights claims. But, as O'Regan J herself described in a survey of the Court's
socio-economic rights jurisprudence preceding this summary, it is consistent
3
with the Court's approach in nearly all of those decisions.
This concern with procedure and the democratic values it promotes 
what the Court often calls 'participatory democracy"' - is evident in three
other socio-economic-rights decisions of the 2009 term. In Joseph v City
ofJohannesburg - in which the Court upheld a challenge by Johannesburg
residents to the City's failure to provide adequate process before terminating
electricity services - the Court emphasised that '[c]ompliance by local gov
ernment with its procedural fairness obligations is crucial therefore, not only
for the protection of citizens' rights, but also to facilitate trust in the public
5
administration and in our participatory democracy'.
In Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement of SA v Premier of the Province
of KwaZulu-Natal, a Durban-based shack-dweller's movement challenged
the constitutionality of the KwaZulu-Natal Elimination and Prevention of
Re-emergence of Slums Act 6 of 2007 arguing that the eviction provisions (s
16) of the Act violated s 26 of the Constitution, in particular the newly estab
lished engagement requirement. 6 After rejecting Justice Yacoob's expansive
interpretation that the Act could be read to require mitigating procedures,
including engagement, prior to eviction, the Court held the Act invalid for
its failure to 'ensure that [residents'] housing rights are not violated without
7
proper notice and consideration of other alternatives'.
Finally, in Residents ofJoe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha
Homes, the Court revisited the engagement remedy - this time deploying it
to return some measure of control to the more than 20,000 residents whose
eviction it approved as part of the N2 redevelopment project. 8 Despite finding
3

4

5

6
7
8

Ibid para 65 (in its earlier cases, '[t]he Court did not seek to draft policy or to determine its content.
Instead, having found that the policy adopted by government did not meet the required constitu
tional standard of reasonableness, the Court, in Grootboom, required government to revise its policy
to provide for those most in need and, in Treatment Action Campaign No 2, to remove anomalous
restrictions'). The one notable exception is Khosa v Minister ofSocial Development 2004 (6) SA
505 (CC) in which the Court ordered the government to extend social welfare benefits to permanent
residents. As Jackie Dugard has pointed out, however, the exceptional willingness to set policy
directly in Khosa may be attributable to the equally strong s 9 equality dimension of the case. See J
Dugard 'Courts and the Poor in South Africa: A Critique of Systemic Judicial Failures to Advance
Transformative Justice (2008) 24 SAJHR 214, 235. Moreover, even in that case the Court merely
extended a benefit created by the legislature rather than crafting a completely new one.
The Court has expressed concern with developing participatory democracy in contexts outside
of the socio-economic rights case. See Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National
Assembly 2006 (6) SA416 (CC) Matatiele Municipality v President ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa
2006 (5) SA47 (CC).
2010 ( 4) SA 55 (CC) para 46. Joseph principally deals with the Promotion ofAdministrative Justice
Act 3 of2000 (PAJA). But the residents argued that the City's termination without sufficient notice
violated their right to access to adequate housing under s 26 of the Constitution, which, broadly
understood, puts the case in the realm of socio-economic rights decisions.
2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC).
Ibid para 122, the discussion of engagement is at paras 113-5.
2010(3)SA454(CC).
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that the City of Cape Town had meaningfully engaged with the residents, the
Court issued a detailed order and agenda requiring the City to engage further
over the timing and details of the eviction process - a requirement that ulti
mately led to the City's decision to postpone the eviction plans and reconsider
the in situ upgrade the residents had sought. 9 The Court recently responded
by setting aside its original eviction order because the government's 21-month
delay in proceeding with the eviction and apparent decision to pursue in
situ upgrade instead rendered the original order - and most importantly the
10
engagement process it required - impossible to implement.
Taken together, these cases are the culmination of a strong trend towards
the proceduralisation of socio-economic rights that many commentators have
argued fails to fulfil their original promise. 11 This triumph of proceduralisa
tion undeniably restricts the direct transformative potential of these rights.
But there is another aspect to this trend - an aspect reflected in the Court's
emphasis on participatory democracy and the ability ofprocedural remedies to
democratise the rights-enforcement process. Engagement is the most concrete
manifestation of this aspect and, as the Joe Slovo result partially illustrates,
robust development of engagement promises to address some of the concerns
that proceduralisation raises. It also offers an alternative mechanism for
enforcing social and economic rights largely outside of direct litigation.
This article considers what the triumph of proceduralisation means for
future social and economic rights litigation and argues that, properly devel
oped engagement can give poor people and their advocates an important
12
and powerful enforcement tool. At the same time, engagement can help
strengthen and promote consistent attention to the constitutional values these
rights protect. Tapping this potential requires the Constitutional Court and
lower courts to apply the remedy more consistently, to develop its require
ments more fully and to apply those requirements robustly where government
fails to engage meaningfully on social welfare policy. The courts are only the
starting point, however. For engagement to truly succeed, government must
develop comprehensive engagement policies and institutionalise those poli

9
I0
11

12

The government's decision to postpone and reconsider was reported by A Majavu 'Evictions
Suspended- Shack Dwellers Reprieved' Sowetan (4 September 2009).
In the matter between Residents ofJoe Slovo Community, Western Cape CCT 22/08 [2011] paras
30-1 (Joe Slovo II).
Danie Brand coined the term 'proceduralisation' in D Brand 'The Proceduralisation of South African
Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, or "What Are Socio-Economic Rights For?"' in H Botha,
A van der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution
(2003) 33. David Bilchitz has been a consistent critic of the Court's failure to incorporate a
minimum core requirement and its preference for procedural remedies. See D Bilchitz 'Towards a
Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for Future Socio-Economic
Rights Jurisprudence' (2003) 19 SAJHR I, 8-11. More recently, Theunis Roux has characterised the
Court's socio-economic rights jurisprudence as part of a broader attempt to preserve its institutional
security against the African National Congress (ANC). See T Roux 'Principle and Pragmatism on
the Constitutional Court of South Africa' (2009) 7 Int J Con L 106, 106. Jackie Dugard has also
criticised the Court's cases as anti-poor. See Dugard (note 3 above).
Because of its focus on engagement, this article deals primarily with the Joe S/ovo decision and
earlier, related, decisions.
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cies at all levels. Finally, civil society must expand its role beyond pressing for
engagement in individual cases into advocating for such institutionalisation.
WHAT

Is

ENGAGEMENT?

Lilian Chenwi and Kate Tissington recently published a handbook for com
13
munities outlining the engagement remedy and what it requires. As they
describe it '[m]eaningful engagement is an important development in the
approach of the courts to enforce socio-economic rights and promote active
14
participation in service provision'.
Chenwi and Tissington note that the Court discussed the concept in earlier
15
cases, most notably Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers, but
it first applied the remedy in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township
and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg - a case chal
lenging the eviction and relocation of several inner-city residents as part of
16
Johannesburg's redevelopment programme.
Olivia Road held that engagement is required by several constitutional
rights, including the right to access to adequate housing and the rights to life
17
and human dignity, and also described several key features of engagement.
First, engagement does not presuppose any substantive outcome. For example,
in the housing context, some situations require 'mak[ing] permanent housing
available and, in others, to provide no housing at all. The possibilities between
these extremes are almost endless'. 18 Second, in most cases engagement can
not be 'ad hoc'. 19 This means that long-term planning for social welfare policy
must involve engagement with affected citizens from the start and requires a
20
cadre of 'competent sensitive council workers skilled in engagement'. Third,
civil society groups have a constitutionally recognised role to assist vulner
able populations in the engagement process and to 'facilitate the engagement
21
process in every possible way'. Finally, the government must develop and
maintain a public record of each engagement so that courts can later review
not only the outcome but also the engagement process: 'the provision of a
complete and accurate account of the process of engagement including at least
the reasonable efforts of the municipality with that process would ordinarily
be essential'. 22 This is important because '[t]he absence of any engagement
or the unreasonable response of a municipality in the engagement process

13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

L Chenwi & K Tissington 'Engaging Meaningfully with Government on Socio-Economic Rights:
A Focus on the Right to Housing' (2010) <http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clc-projects/
socio-economic-rights/ser-publications>.
Ibid 8.
2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC).
2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC).
Ibid.
Ibid para 18.
Ibid para 19.
Ibid para 19.
Ibid para 20.
Ibid para 21.
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would ordinarily be a weighty consideration against the grant of an ejectment
order'. 23
Since Olivia Road, the Court has used the remedy in only two other cases
and discussed it in several others. In Mamba v Minister ofSocial Development,
the Court ordered the Gauteng government and others to engage with repre
sentatives of internally displaced refugees of the anti-immigrant violence that
swept South Africa in early 2008 over the timing and procedures for clos
24
ing the refugee camps. The engagement order in that case largely mirrored
the Olivia Road order but added a lengthy list of specific organisations with
which the government entities were required to engage. 25 Unlike Olivia Road,
in which engagement successfully settled the dispute, in Mamba, the Gauteng
government largely ignored the Court's order and interpreted its obligations
as limited to reporting the continuing progress of its closure plans rather than
negotiating over those plans. 26 The plaintiffs sought dismissal of the case as
moot once the camps were closed and so the Court never addressed the issue
whether the government's cribbed interpretation was consistent with the
engagement order. 27
More recently, in Joe Slovo, the Court incorporated a detailed engagement
order as a condition for permitting the City of Cape Town to proceed with the
28
eviction of over 20,000 residents of the Joe Slovo settlement. Two aspects
of Joe Slovo represent important innovations in the Court's use of engage
ment. First, it shows that courts can use engagement to return some measure
of control to the parties following a substantive decision on the merits in a
socio-economic rights case. Second, the detailed engagement order is a good
example of a more court-directed form of engagement than in either Olivia
Road or Mamba. Both features show that engagement can involve relatively
strong court control and also that it can be combined with partial or complete
resolution of substantive legal issues while still maintaining some flexibility
over the implications of a particular interpretation. 29
Collectively, these decisions sketch the rough outline of a highly flexible
and potentially important aspect of the socio-economic rights (and possibly
other) provisions in the Constitution. It is clear that government has an obliga
tion to engage - and engage early- whenever it develops social welfare policy
and certainly well before any threat of litigation emerges. Citizens affected
by those policies and civil society organisations have a constitutional claim

23
24
25
26

27
28

29

Ibid.
CCT 65/08, Court Order dated 21 August 2008 {CC).
Ibid para 5.
Mamba Duncan Breen 's September 2008 affidavit in terms of para 3 of the Court order dated 21
August 2008, 8, 22, 31-43 (describing the sequence of events following the order and conclud

ing: 'In my view one cannot describe [the single meeting the Gauteng government attended) as a
"meaningful engagement" as required by the Constitutional Court order').
CoRMSA press release (16 October 2008).
Joe Slovo (note 8 above) para 7.
I develop this idea more fully in 'Engagement's Possibilities and Limits as a Socioeconomic Rights
Remedy' (forthcoming 2010) Washington U Global Studies L Rev.
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to seek engagement and should be able to enforce their right to engagement
through litigation.
On the other end of the spectrum, courts can inquire whether the govern
ment has adequately engaged with affected citizens in every case challenging
social-welfare policies and to order further engagement where necessary.
When ordering engagement, courts after Joe Slovo have the authority to
control the engagement agenda and to order engagement with non-parties.
Courts can also combine engagement with partial or complete substantive
determinations of the legal issues in the case.
Beyond these very general parameters, however, when and how government
must engage remains unclear and this lack of clarity hampers the effective
ness of the remedy. Perhaps most important is the lack of a direct precedent
sanctioning the government's failure to engage meaningfully - both Joe Slovo
and Mamba were missed opportunities for enforcing Olivia Road's statement
that the lack of meaningful engagement can itself be grounds for refusing
to permit government to proceed with implementation of a policy. But it is
not only the courts that must develop engagement. The government and civil
society are equal players and have constitutional roles to establish policies,
procedures and standards for engagement even absent court direction.
The Court's recent reversal ofthe Joe Slovo eviction order both underscores
the importance of engagement and the difficulties and uncertainties surround
ing implementation of the process. 30 The Court highlighted the central role
that engagement played in the original eviction order to explain why the
21-month delay required lifting it. It cited four reasons why the parties could
no longer comply with the order. First, the government no longer planned to
relocate residents; second, the original timetable (including the time-frame
for engagement) had become irrelevant; third, '[t]here has been little or no
engagement in relation to the relocation process nor is there likely to be any
engagement in relation to relocation in the future'; and, finally, much of the
order served no purpose without relocation, engagement and the division of
31
residents into those who could return and those who could not. Summing up
the net effect of abandoning relocation and the consequent need for engage
ment over its details, the Court stated that '[t]he only part of the order that
would remain if all of these aspects fall away is the bare, unconditional, order
32
requiring all the applicants ... to vacate the Joe Slovo area'. In other words,
the right to evict without the corresponding duty to comply with the detailed
and carefully structured engagement order was no longer 'just and equitable'
33
under all the circumstances.
It is also important to note that the opportunity for the Court to address
these changed circumstances was a direct result of the detailed time-frame
30

31
32
33

It is also worth noting that this decision is one of the first in which the newly configured Court
has addressed the engagement remedy. Joe Slovo II (note 10 above) paras 18-9 (noting that seven
members of the Court participating in this decision did not participate in the first decision).
Ibid para 30.
Ibid para 31.
Ibid.
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and reporting requirements that the Court included as part of the engagement
34
order.
In the high-profile and politically sensitive context of the mass eviction
of the Joe Slovo community, the Court was able to muster the institutional
energy to address the government's delayed response and to take the highly
unusual step of reversing its own decision on the basis of those changed cir
cumstances. But it will not always be possible for courts to shift course and
correct their own orders where the underlying situation has changed. More
importantly, the substantial uncertainty over how courts can and should struc
ture engagement orders and subsequent interventions like this one makes the
potential benefits of the process highly contingent and uncertain.
Before turning to some initial suggestions for how courts, government
and civil society can begin to develop engagement, I will briefly outline the
theoretical underpinnings of engagement - in particular, the relationship
between engagement and participatory democracy that the Court has empha
sised. Drawing this connection helps to explain how engagement can become
an important tool not only for enforcing the socio-economic rights in the
Constitution but also for developing a sustained commitment to constitutional
democracy more generally.
II

ENGAGEMENT AS PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY

Theunis Roux has argued that the Constitutional Court's approach to
socio-economic rights is representative of what he calls the Court's mix of
35
pragmatism and principle in constitutional adjudication more generally. With
the notable exception of the Treatment Action Campaign decisions, he char
acterises the socio-economic rights cases as pragmatic decisions in which the
Court has relied on a flexible conception of separation of powers and adopted
context-specific tests to manage its relationship with the political branches. 36
For Roux, the reasonableness test the Court has used in each of its socio
economic rights cases is a prime example of a pragmatic approach because it
is case-specific and gives the Court ample room to manoeuvre in subsequent
cases that might have serious political overtones. 37 He contrasts this pragma
tism with other instances in which the Court was able to take a harder - and,
in his view, more principled - approach either because the African National
Congress (ANC) supported the decision or because it aligned with broader
38
public opinion despite ANC opposition.
By focusing on the political undercurrents of the cases he selects, Roux's
analysis highlights an important dimension ofthose cases and provides a more
complete picture of the disputes involved. But Roux's claim that whenever the
Court adopts a context-specific test, like the reasonableness test, the Court is

34
35
36
37
38

Ibid paras 5-16 (describing the parties' negotiations and the Court's responses).
Roux (note 11 above) 135-6.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid 137-8.
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acting out of institutional self-interest and ignores the Court's emphasis on
participatory democracy. Taking that aspect into account provides an alter
native - and importantly, principled - explanation for the Court's approach.
Rather than simply setting up room to manoeuvre in a future case with poten
tial political consequences, the flexibility of the reasonableness test generally
- and the engagement remedy specifically - is designed to create interaction
between affected citizens and the government over the constitutional values
these rights represent.
Viewed from this perspective, the socio-economic rights decisions are part
of the Court's larger interest in using its decisions to develop a broad-based
and sustained commitment to constitutional democracy in South Africa. This
is, I think, what the Court means when it speaks of participatory democracy
- a dialogue between the government and the citizens it serves over constitu
tional values. 39
Procedural remedies like engagement promote that kind of dialogue and
thus give the courts an important role to play while still democratising the
process of constitutional development. The result is a collaborative model of
constitutional development in which courts, citizens and the political branches
each participate in negotiating the meaning of the Constitution.
While Roux is clearly correct that the flexibility of remedies like engage
ment allow the Court in many cases to avoid direct confrontation with the
political branches over policy decisions, the Court's interest in avoiding such
conflict is as much driven by a desire to give these rights effect while initiat
ing a national conversation over what they require as it is in preserving itself.
In this respect, the Court is responding to the problem of building legitimacy
identified by James Gibson and Gregory Caldiera in a series of surveys of the
South African public's views of the Constitutional Court. Gibson and Caldiera
conducted a panel survey of South Africans in 1996 and 1997 to test if what
40
they call 'legitimacy theory' applies to the Constitutional Court. Legitimacy
theory hypothesises that courts achieve the moral authority necessary to
obtain compliance with controversial decisions where the society 'view[s]
courts as appropriate institutions for such decisions' and have a 'dedication to
the health and efficacy of an institution [that] overrides dissatisfaction with its
41
immediate outputs'. Their initial survey results showed that the Court lacked
42
substantial legitimacy.
Gibson conducted a follow-up survey in 2004 to study if the Constitutional
Court and the South African Parliament had developed legitimacy over time.

39

40
41
42

In 'Demosprudence in Comparative Perspective' (forthcoming 2010) Stanford J of Int law, I
develop a more extended response to Roux and identify engagement as one of several examples of
the Court's broad concern with participatory democracy. 'Demosprudence' is a concept developed
by L Guinier & G Torres in 'Forward: Demosprudence Through Dissent' (2008) 122 Harvard l Rev
4.
J Gibson & G Caldiera 'Defenders of Democracy? Legitimacy, Popular Acceptance, and the South
African Constitutional Court' (2003) 65 J Pol I.
Ibid2.
Ibid 3.
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In this study, Gibson tested what he calls 'a theory of "positivity bias"'.
Positivity bias posits that courts gain institutional legitimacy when citizens
are repeatedly exposed to the symbols of the court itself, because such expo
sure develops an understanding and expectation that courts are separate from
regular politics. Gibson explains that it is repeated exposure that is important,
not necessarily the substantive outcome that results in the exposure. Therefore,
'even when the initial stimulus for paying attention to courts is negative (for
example a controversial court decision), judicial symbols enhance legitimacy
' 44

Gibson concluded that from 1996 to 2004 public support for the
Constitutional Court has slowly grown - with significant differences among
different racial and ethnic groups. 45 He argued that two things must happen
for South Africa's democratic experiment to continue to succeed. The first
is that 'a democratic political culture must be nourished. Both the citizens
and the elites must commit themselves to the institutions and processes of
46
democracy'. The second is that 'effective and legitimate political institutions
47
must be created and sustained'. In Gibson's view 'the Constitutional Court
is particularly important on this score, especially since the dominant problem
of African democracies today is their illiberalism (their lack of respect for
minority rights)'. 48
Engagement dovetails nicely with this prescription because it gives courts a
tool to actively manage a process of exposure both to the judiciary itself and,
more importantly, to the constitutional principles that its judgments enforce.
Engagement requires the political branches to pay specific attention to their
constitutional responsibilities when developing social policies and to consult
citizens on their own views of what the Constitution requires. Applied con
sistently this creates the opportunity for sustained and repeated exposure to
the Constitution - precisely the kind ofexposure that Gibson says is necessary
to develop legitimacy over time. The courts act as managers of this process
intervening where necessary to ensure that engagement is meaningful and
determining when additional engagement is necessary.
III

DEVELOPING ENGAGEMENT

For engagement to act as a legitimacy-creating mechanism, however, requires
courts to continue to develop the remedy, and, in particular, to intervene where
government fails meaningfully to engage. It also requires the state to commit
to a comprehensive development of engagement policies and procedures and
institutionalisation of those policies and procedures throughout the admin

43
44
45
46
47
48

J Gibson 'The Evolving Legitimacy of the South African Constitutional Court' in F du Bois & S du
Bois-Pedain (eds) Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Apartheid South Africa (2009) 233.
Ibid 234.
Ibid 260-2.
Ibid 262-3.
Ibid 263.
Ibid.
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istrative state. Finally, civil society must expand its role beyond facilitating
specific engagements into advocating for such comprehensive development
and institutionalisation, including by using its experience and expertise to
offer suggestions for engagement policy.
The Socio-Economic Rights Project of the Community Law Centre at the
University of Western Cape and the Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South
Africa (SERI) co-hosted a roundtable on engagement in March 2010 that took
the first steps towards addressing the many unanswered questions engagement
49
raises. Participants included representatives of civil society organisations,
public interest lawyers, community leaders and government officials. The
willingness of those diverse players to recognise the potential importance of
engagement and to work together to begin a process for developing it is in
itself an important step. However, a central theme of the roundtable was the
tremendous uncertainty surrounding engagement and the immense practical
problems that conducting meaningful engagement poses. In the following
paragraphs, I offer some very preliminary suggestions for addressing some of
the questions and challenges that the roundtable raised.

(a) Institutionalising engagement
One ofthe major issues ofthe discussions was the lack ofa clear understanding
of the role government should play in engaging affected communities during
the policy-development process. Related to this, Lauren Royston, a principal
at Development Works and advisor to the Centre for Applied Legal Studies
(CALS) at the University of the Witwatersrand, said that many organisations
and activists feel that the Court's precedents to date 'plac[e] too much respon
sibility on NGOs and communities with insufficient emphasis on the role the
state (government) should perform'. 50
Participants also noted that, even where government is willing to engage,
the process raises significant practical difficulties, including deciding at what
point to engage with affected communities, defining relevant communities
and stakeholders, establishing effective channels of communication, and
determining at what point it has sufficiently engaged despite the lack of a
clear consensus.
There is no doubt that the Constitutional Court and lower courts have much
work to do in defining more specifically the role that government should play
and, in particular in insisting that when government fails to engage it will not
be permitted to implement the resulting policy. But Olivia Road imposes a
key programmatic requirement - that government avoids ad hoc engagement
whenever possible and that doing so requires a cadre of employees trained in
engagement. 51 This means that government at all levels must begin to develop

49

50
51

'Report on the Roundtable Discussion on Meaningful Engagement in the Realisation of Socio
Economic Rights' (4 March 2010) (Roundtable) <http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/
clc-projects/socio-economic-rights/confererence/previous-conference>.
Ibid 5.
Olivia Road (note 16 above) para 21.
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a bureaucratic structure focused on engagement. A robust implementation
of this requirement would itself go a long way towards alleviating many of
the problems the roundtable participants identified. A bureaucratic structure
focused on engagement can help bring· consistent attention to the state's
engagement obligations and the underlying constitutional values engagement
is intended to protect.
Trevor Mitchell, the head of housing and policy research for the City of
Cape Town, stated during the roundtable discussion that engagement typically
takes place at the project level. 52 This was confirmed by Myrtle Stuurman,
assistant director of policy in the Department of Local Government and
Housing for the Western Cape. 53 While the specific negotiations of each
individual engagement clearly must relate to specific projects, government
officials should take a much broader view of their engagement responsibilities
and work to develop a more generalised capacity for engagement outside of
specific projects. To ensure systematic implementation of engagement, gov
ernment must adopt a more comprehensive approach that does not reinvent
new engagement policies and practices each time a project reaches the plan
ning and implementation stage. Royston's call for a comprehensive strategy
on engagement in the eviction context and for a broader strategic discussion
is one way to get governments to begin thinking about engagement in a more
54
systematic way.
Institutionalising engagement in this way can help alleviate the problem
of lack of cohesion that was a repeated theme in the roundtable discussion.
Officials with training and experience are more likely to become adept at deal
ing with internal community conflict and can bring opposed groups together
in the engagement process. By contrast where engagement is conducted ad
hoc by officials whose primary role involves substantive service delivery
there is a real risk engagement will fail for lack of proper training. Moreover,
more consistent engagement is possible where a government has a permanent
infrastructure devoted to the process. Lilian Chenwi's suggestion that govern
ment establish an outreach programme for communities is one example of the
kind of institutional functions this bureaucratisation can perform. 55
Institutionalisation should also enhance the capacity and willingness of
government to approach engagement from a holistic rather than narrow per
spective. Creating a bureaucratic structure tasked specifically with developing
an engagement programme and policies for implementing the engagement
requirement creates the kind of sustained and long-term focus on the process
necessary to make engagement a meaningful process. Over time, officials
focused on engagement can begin to develop best practices for engagement
that can be applied across programmes.

52
53
54

55

Roundtable (note 49 above) 8.
Ibid 10.
Ibid 11.
Ibid 8.
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Charles Epp's work on the development of what he calls the 'legalized
accountability' administrative model offers important insights into both the
mechanism for developing this institutionalisation and its potential to make
engagement into a meaningful process for protecting social and economic
rights. 56 Epp argues that '[i]n the modern state, rights are empty promises
in many contexts unless they are given life in administrative policies and
57
practices'. He has documented a shift in a range of areas in which 'U.S.
administrative governance became significantly, even dramatically more
rights-focused; the rights policies at the heart ofthe change became institution
alized and integrated into government agencies in substantial administrative
depth'. 58
In a recent book, Epp analyses evidence of the development of the legalised
accountability model in three areas: police use of force, workplace sexual har
assment, and playground safety in the United States and the United Kingdom. 59
In each instance, organisation and bureaucratic reforms to protect civil rights
developed in response to social-movement group pressure, including legal pres
sure. Epp emphasises that the model made rights real through 'administrative
systems that are legally framed and comprehensive, encompassing a range of
mechanisms for changing individual behavior and organizational culture' to
60
advance new norms. Epp identifies three characteristics these mechanisms
share: (1) 'administrative policies that state an organizational commitment to
legal norms ... '; (2) 'training and communication systems intended to convey
the importance of these policies and to change organizational culture in keep
ing with them'; and (3) 'internal oversight aimed at assessing progress in this
61
endeavour and identifying violations of the policy'.
Epp's principal example of this model is the development of institutional
ised policies and practices to address the problem of police brutality in the
1960s and 1970s in the US. Epp notes that a key report to the US President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice in 1967
outlined the basic framework for the legalised accountability model. 62 After
concluding that the problem required developing centralised policies, the
Report described what Epp calls the essential elements of the model:
Rules: Departments, relying on careful internal research into 'problem areas', should system
atically develop clear internal administrative rules governing officer discretion. Departments,
the report urged, should employ internal legal advisers to aid in developing such policies.
Training: After adopting such rules, departments should systematically disseminate them
so that all officers are aware of them, and should provide ongoing training so that officers
know how to follow policies in practice. Oversight: After such implementation, departments

56
57
58

59
60

61
62

C Epp Making Rights Real: Activists, Bureaucrats, and the Creation ofthe Legalist State (2009).
C Epp 'Implementing the Rights Revolution: Repeat Players and the Interpretation of Diffuse Legal
Messages' (2008) 71 Law & Contemp Probs 41.
Ibid 42.
Epp (note 56 above) 216.
Ibid 25.
Ibid.
Ibid 47-9.

PROCEDURALISATION'S TRIUMPH AND ENGAGEMENT'S PROMISE

119

should carry out ongoing review of the policies' effectiveness and should devise appropriate
methods of 'internal control' over officers' actions."

While the problem of developing engagement policies is not directly analo
gous to reforming police practices, there are sufficient similarities that the
model Epp describes can be usefully adapted. Taking the key elements in
turn, research-based rules for conducting engagement could be developed
over time and through a centralised and consistent framework. Rather than
using internal legal advisers, in the engagement context, professionals trained
in alternative dispute resolution technique and theory would be the more
appropriate place to look for analogous guidance in developing specific rules
for when and how to engage.
The role of training is obvious but reinforces the need for institutionalisa
tion. Once government develops engagement policies and procedures, it must
disseminate those policies and train officials to implement them. Unlike in
the police context, the challenge for engagement is not to reform the practices
of an existing professional culture. Instead, it requires building a new one to
implement engagement on a consistent and sustained basis. While in many
respects that challenge is much easier because it does not involve altering an
entrenched culture, it will require redeploying scarce resources.
Finally, oversight would play out in a very different way for an institution
alised approach to engagement than for police-reform. It will be important
to ensure that individual engagements are conducted in compliance with the
centralised policies and procedures, but the real focus of oversight should
be the development of best practices for engagement. Each engagement will
bring its own specific challenges and require adaptation of the basic model,
but some aspects ofengagement can be generalised and applied systematically
across engagements. Abstracting these broader lessons from each individual
engagement and using them to improve the centralised engagement policies
and procedures allows for an iterative process of continual improvement over
time.
Susan Sturm's and Howard Gadlin's analysis of the Center for Cooperative
Resolution/Office of the Ombudsman (CCR) at the US National Institutes of
Health (NIH) offers a potentially useful set of principles for developing best
practices for engagement. 64 CCR is a conflict resolution programme within
NIH that, in addition to resolving specific disputes within the organisation,
has sought to identify systemic issues within those disputes and develop solu
tions to those issues over time. Sturm and Gadlin analysed CCR's programme
and identified four elements of a conflict-resolution process capable of gener
ating systemic change: '(1) a boundary-spanning institutional intermediary,
(2) root cause methodology, (3) institutional legitimacy within communities
65
of practice, and (4) participatory accountability'.

63
64
65

Ibid 49.
S Sturm & H Gadlin 'Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change' (2007) J Disp Resol 1.
Ibid 39.

120

(2011) 27 SAJHR

An institutionalised approach to engagement could be structured similarly
to CCR - something like an engagement department - and incorporate each
of these elements. Instead of focused on the internal operations of a particular
government entity, such an engagement department would be tasked with
developing policy and procedures for engagement across substantive policy
areas, with housing as the obvious initial target given the Court's development
of engagement within the eviction process. Establishing a separate entity
within government would satisfy Sturm's and Gadlin's first requirement of a
boundary-spanning intermediary, which they argue is necessary to identify
66
systemic problems across individual interventions. Like the CCR, a separate
engagement department could more easily identify patterns among individual
engagements and refine the engagement process to respond more effectively
in particular situations.
Separating engagement from the government department responsible for
developing substantive policy would also create the kind of dual insider/out
sider perspective that Sturm and Gadlin identify as a key strength of CCR. 67
This is critical for Sturm's and Gadlin's second element - root-cause analysis.
Root-cause analysis simply means identifying systemic issues that give rise
to individual disputes and identifying solutions to address those issues on
a broader scale. Applied to engagement, root-cause analysis could take at
least two forms. First, it would mean developing the kind of best practices
for engagement I suggested earlier. Second, it could also involve identifying
systemic issues in the policy-development processes used by government at
different levels that give rise to community protest.
Divorcing engagement from substantive policy development would also put
those involved in a position to interact more freely with affected communi
ties and civil society organisations active on socio-economic rights issues. As
more neutral players, engagement officials would have greater credibility with
these external constituencies and also greater capacity to develop the institu
tional legitimacy within those communities that Sturm and Gadlin identify as
the third element of CCR's successful model.
Finally, participatory accountability means that the results of each engage
ment as well as the details of the engagement process must be subject to public
comment and reaction and there must be a mechanism for incorporating those
critiques into revised engagement policies. As the roundtable participants
noted, transparency in and monitoring of individual engagements is crucial. 68
The public-reporting requirement Olivia Road established can play a key role
here by requiring that government document the processes of each engage
ment and make those reports available for public comment by citizens and
organisations that were not directly involved.
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Civil society pressure

As noted above, the roundtable participants expressed concern over the
Court's emphasis on the role ofNGOs and civil society groups. This concern
is valid and the government itself must begin to assume a leadership role. But
Epp's work suggests that civil society has a critical role to play not merely in
assisting individual engagements but, more importantly, in applying consist
ent pressure on government to institutionalise its approach to engagement.
Success on that broader programmatic level can create the kind of institutional
capacity that will relieve pressure on civil society over the long term.
To be sure, social rights advocates must continue to assist in individual
engagements. And one key issue on that level is ensuring groups represent the
views of the community. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) active on
particular issues bring the advantage of a broader understanding of the issue
on a national level and can bring that broader perspective to the discussion.
At the same time, however, they must ensure that the views of the particular
community or communities directly affected are adequately presented. As
S'bu Zikode, a leader ofthe Abahlali shack-dwellers movement eloquently put
it in his statement at a meeting on engagement hosted by CALS:
It is one thing if we are beneficiaries who need delivery. It is another thing if we are citizens
who want to shape the future of our cities, even our country. It is another thing if we are
69
human beings who have decided that it is our duty to humanize the world.

Civil society's role in individual engagement is to empower citizens to play
the kind of active role this describes and which participatory democracy
envisions.
In addition to paying careful attention to their role in individual engage
ments, however, social rights advocates should expand their efforts to include
advocacy - and, where necessary, litigation - to develop an institutionalised
approach to engagement. Epp notes that despite the call for administrative
reform by the 1967 report and others, real police reform did not begin to take
root until the 1980s and 1990s and only then as the result of a strategic liti
gation campaign focused on establishing liability specifically for the failure
adequately to train and manage frontline police forces. 70 As Epp describes it
'the development of a legal norm favoring legalized accountability in polic
ing ... grew less from police departments' innovations than from two other
sources: activist pressure and a reform campaign among policy experts on the
71
border of policing and academia'.
Following Epp's model, putting pressure on government to institutionalise
its approach to engagement will require three elements. The first is a con
certed political effort to raise the profile of engagement. The roundtable and
the CALS conference that preceded it are a significant start in this process.
SERI's proposal for a follow-up housing indaba and the apparent receptivity
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of some government officials to the idea shows further promise. It will be
important, however, to shift the conversation away from the specifics of indi
vidual engagements into the need for institutionalisation described above.
This raises the second element of Epp's model: collaboration with policy
experts and academics. In Epp's account it was not only activist pressure
and litigation that succeeded in institutionalising police reforms, but also the
development of practical ideas for administrative reform by policy experts
with knowledge of the police field but who were based at universities or
73
other outside institutions. Successful institutionalisation of engagement
will require developing the same kind of expertise with academics and other
experts in areas such as urban planning and dispute resolution design.
The third element is litigation. The conversation that has already started
over engagement was the direct result of the highly successful effort in Olivia
Road. Since that remarkable decision, however, engagement has played a
relatively modest role in litigation. Abahlali represents successful deployment
of the concept to overturn state policy inconsistent with its values, and Joe
Slovo - while arguably a failure to enforce meaningful engagement prior to
eviction - represents a successful use of engagement as a tool for mitigating
the effects of a negative court ruling. It also offers an important new model for
court-directed engagement. But Epp's studies suggest that real reform is most
likely to develop where the government faces a consistent threat of potential
liability in litigation for failing to develop administrative reforms.
(c)

Court enforcement

For the threat of litigation to actually provoke reform thus requires not
merely activists willing to bring cases, but also courts that are responsive
to their claims. Kate Tissington pointed out that, despite the relative success
of engagement in Olivia Road, that experience shows a clear reluctance by
government to engage on issues other than those that a court directly enforces:
'[g]overnment addresses only the issues they are ordered to address ... when
other issues arise, at a later stage, it becomes difficult to get government to
74
address these issues'.
The Court's few experiences using the engagement remedy reinforce the
need for relatively strong court involvement at least until the government
develops an adequate engagement infrastructure. In Mamba the Court's
repeated engagement orders were almost completely ineffective. The Gauteng
government simply moved forward with its closure plans and never seri
75
ously considered the arguments raised by the refugees. If the Court had
combined the engagement order with a temporary injunction against closing
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the camps, the government would have had much greater incentive to engage
meaningfully.
The Joe Slovo experience offers further evidence that relatively strong
court intervention is still necessary to provoke meaningful engagement. As
Tissington also noted, 'there were strong doubts on the quality of [the pre
76
eviction] meaningful engagement' in that case. It was only after the Court
ordered engagement over the details of the eviction process itself - includ
ing devising a detailed agenda of issues for that engagement and specifically
requiring reservation of a set percentage of new homes for community
residents - that the government finally took seriously the possibility of in situ
77
upgrade that was a key demand of the residents.
The Joe Slovo litigation thus illustrates the difference that strong court
intervention can make. Prior to the eviction the lower courts refused to
recognise the government's failure to engage and, like in Mamba, the govern
ment was able to proceed with its plans. Quoting Justice Albie Sachs, Sandra
Liebenberg succinctly summarises the inadequacy of the engagement process
prior to eviction:
the willingness to effectively condone the inadequate consultation processes raises serious
concerns. This consultation process was littered with mixed messages conveyed by an array
of officials, broken promises and, in the words of Judge Albie Sachs, the 'frequent employ
ment of a top-down approach, where the purpose of reporting back to the community was
seen as being to pass on information about decisions already taken rather than to involve the
residents as partners in the process of decision-making itself'."

Liebenberg goes on to note that, notwithstanding the majority's conclusion
that the consultations satisfied the government's engagement duties, in fact,
'[t]his represents the antithesis of the "structured, consistent and careful
engagement" by "competent, sensitive" officials skilled in engagement which
the court has previously underscored when state organs seek to evict large
79
groups of vulnerable people'.
The Court's unwillingness to hold the government accountable for its
insufficient engagement efforts by at least temporarily delaying the eviction
directly was a missed opportunity to demonstrate the Court's commitment
to enforcing Olivia Road's directive that '[t]he absence of any engagement
or the unreasonable response of a municipality in the engagement process
would ordinarily be a weighty consideration against the grant of an ejectment
order'. 80
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On the other hand, once the Court ordered the government to engage over
the details of the eviction process itself, the government was forced to recon
sider its plans. Unlike the Mamba order that, beyond listing the parties and
setting a reporting deadline, left the details of engagement to the parties them
selves, the Joe Slovo order imposed significant constraints. First, the Court
established a detailed engagement agenda, including 'the exact, time, manner
and conditions' of the relocation and also 'the precise temporary residential
81
accommodation units' for the relocated residents. While well short of an
injunction stopping the eviction process altogether, this agenda slowed the
process substantially and provided the residents with substantial leverage with
the government.
Second, the Court imposed two substantive requirements for the eviction
to proceed: it established detailed standards for the temporary accommoda
tions in Delft, and it ordered the government to allocated 70 per cent of the
low-cost housing units in Joe Slovo to displaced residents. This represents a
different form of court control - making substantive determinations regard
ing plaintiffs' rights and conditioning engagement on the fulfilment of those
obligations. Unlike establishing an engagement agenda or even a full-scale
injunction both of which halt or slow the implementation of policy, making
substantive determinations of this kind sets a baseline for engagement over
the remaining issues.
The Court's subsequent reversal of the eviction order further illustrates the
importance of relatively robust court involvement. As the Court noted, the
government's decision to abandon wholesale eviction rendered the carefully
structured engagement order meaningless. While the residents won the overall
battle to avoid wholesale relocation, the government's opposition to lifting the
eviction order demonstrated its desire to maintain the authority to evict some
proportion of the residents - and at the same time to avoid the constraints of
the original order. The Court's direct intervention to avoid that possibility sets
up the opportunity for it or a lower court to condition any later eviction on
further engagement structured to address the situation as it develops.
With the notable exception of Khosa, the Court has been extremely reluctant
to intervene in either of these ways - to slow implementation or make direct
changes to large-scale social and economic programmes that are already
well advanced. In Olivia Road the Court's intervention was arguably easier
because the lower court had issued an injunction and the government had not
82
restarted the programme prior to the engagement. Even in Minister ofHealth
v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (5 July 2002) - which
is widely hailed as one of the Court's most muscular enforcement efforts 
there were clear signs of a shift in go~ernment policy and the Court's order
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simply reinforced that shift. 83 For engagement to begin to work in the way the
Court hopes, however, it must be willing to enjoin government programmes
in cases where the record demonstrates a lack of real engagement. And, as
in Joe Slovo, it should be willing to make substantive rights determinations
where appropriate. In the short run, this will involve greater intervention in
substantive policy than the Court has typically conducted in the past. But, so
long as the injunction merely halts progress subject to further engagement,
then the Court can still avoid directly fashioning social and economic polices.
Even where it makes a substantive determination, if those determinations
only partially resolve the issues and are limited to the details of a policy, the
Court can still avoid wholesale policy-making while providing leverage to
citizens challenging the policy. Furthermore, Epp's study suggests that, over
time, strong initial court interventions combined with sustained civil society
pressure for reform can catalyse the institutionalisation and development of
a bureaucratic culture committed to engagement that can begin to take the
84
courts out of the process altogether.
IV

CONCLUSION

In Port Elizabeth, Justice Sachs introduced engagement for the first time:
The managerial role of the courts may need to find expression in innovative ways. Thus
one potentially dignified and effective mode of achieving sustainable reconciliations of the
different interests involved is to encourage and require the parties to engage with each other
in a pro-active and honest endeavor to find mutually acceptable solutions. Whenever possi
ble, face-to-face engagement or mediation through a third-party should replace arms-length
combat by intransigence opponents."

The Constitutional Court's and lower court's recent deployments of the
engagement remedy and civil society's and government's strong interest in
developing the concept into a practical tool for implementing social and eco
nomic rights are promising signs that Justice Sachs' vision of a managerial
court assisting adverse parties to discover mutually acceptable solutions to
their disputes has begun to take root. But developing engagement's promise
as an effective remedy will require considerable effort and sustained atten
tion by the courts, civil society and government. Government must commit
to developing a robust infrastructure for engagement and to institutionalise
engagement policies and procedures across the board. To ensure that institu
tionalisation, the Court itself must be willing to at times step out of its purely
managerial role and occasionally make substantive determinations of what
these rights require as well as to prevent government from proceeding with
policies where engagement was clearly inadequate. Civil society can assist
in this process through sustained pressure on government and by bringing
83
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cases not only to enforce engagement in individual instances but also to call
attention to government's lack of sufficient institutionalisation. Without such
sustained effort, engagement runs a real risk of fulfilling the fears of those
who have objected to the Court's preference for procedural remedies and pro
ceduralisation's triumph will mean the loss of the transformative potential of
these rights.
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